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ABSTRACT
This work presents a new distributed Byzantine tolerant federated learning algorithm, HoldOut SGD,
for Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) optimization. HoldOut SGD uses the well known machine
learning technique of holdout estimation, in a distributed fashion, in order to select parameter updates
that are likely to lead to models with low loss values. This makes it more effective at discarding
Byzantine workers inputs than existing methods that eliminate outliers in the parameter-space of the
learned model. HoldOut SGD first randomly selects a set of workers that use their private data in order
to propose gradient updates. Next, a voting committee of workers is randomly selected, and each
voter uses its private data as holdout data, in order to select the best proposals via a voting scheme.
We propose two possible mechanisms for the coordination of workers in the distributed computation
of HoldOut SGD. The first uses a truthful central server and corresponds to the typical setting of
current federated learning. The second is fully distributed and requires no central server, paving the
way to fully decentralized federated learning. The fully distributed version implements HoldOut
SGD via ideas from the blockchain domain, and specifically the Algorand committee selection and
consensus processes. We provide formal guarantees for the HoldOut SGD process in terms of its
convergence to the optimal model, and its level of resilience to the fraction of Byzantine workers.
The analysis assumes convexity of the loss, but the method is applicable to general learning scenarios,
including deep-learning. Empirical evaluation shows that HoldOut SGD is Byzantine-resilient and
efficiently converges to an effectual model for deep-learning tasks, as long as the total number of
participating workers is large and the fraction of Byzantine workers is less than half (< 1/3 for
the fully distributed variant). We show trade-offs between the fraction of Byzantine workers, the
convergence confidence of the algorithm and the number of participating workers.
1 Introduction
Advancements in machine learning have recently introduced the Federated Learning (FL) paradigm [1, 2, 3]. FL
is a distributed learning framework where the data used to train the model is distributed across many user devices
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(e.g., mobile phones or personal computers). The defining characteristic of FL is that data is not transmitted from the
devices. This is motivated by several factors such as privacy concerns, load sharing of computation, and communication
efficiency. Rather than copying data, a centralized parameter server [4] orchestrates a distributed process by which the
workers collaborate and communicate to learn a model [5, 6, 7]. At a high-level, FL progresses in synchronous epochs,
each beginning with the server sending the current model parameters to all workers, which then locally compute, based
on their private data, a new local gradient update. Each worker then sends its update to the server, which aggregates
all updates to compute a new set of model parameters, typically via a Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) step. This
process is repeated until a termination condition is reached.
When the learning process is outsourced to a large crowd, as in FL, it becomes vulnerable to malicious or faulty workers
that (deliberately or unintentionally) cause the process to converge to an ineffectual model. Several approaches have
been suggested to provide Byzantine fault tolerance in FL [7, 8]. All the approaches that have been suggested thus far,
to the best of our knowledge, work in the high-dimensional parameter-space of the learned joint model. That is, they
discard outlier updates that are far from the “center” of all proposed updates (e.g., their mean [8] or trimmed-mean
[9]). While this approach is intuitively reasonable, the selection criterion is not directly related to the loss (and in
turn, to the accuracy) of the resulting model. Consequently, Byzantine nodes can propose updates that appear valid
but result in a poor model after several iterations [10]. Formally, [8] showed that no aggregation rule based on a
linear combination of the updates proposed by the workers tolerates a single Byzantine worker. This notion led to the
introduction of many non-linear aggregation rules, aiming to provide the backbone for a Byzantine-resilient distributed
SGD [11, 8, 9, 10, 7, 12, 13, 6]. These methods were recently shown to break under crafted perturbations of the
parameter updates, leveraging the high-dimensionality of the learning task and the non–convexity of the target loss
function.
Inspired by distributed consensus algorithms and Algorand blockchain committee usage [14], here we suggest a new
approach we call HoldOut SGD, to eliminate the effect of Byzantine updates. Rather than evaluating a gradient based
on geometric criteria, we directly choose gradients based on their contribution to optimizing the accuracy of the model.
Our approach is based on the well known holdout method in learning (e.g., [15, 16]), where a new dataset is used to
choose between different candidate models. Here we use holdout in a very different context, for choosing between
different gradient updates proposed by different workers. HoldOut SGD uses two randomly selected subsets of workers.
The first set of workers, called proposers, proposes gradient updates similarly to traditional workers in FL. The second
set of workers, called the voting committee, is responsible for carefully selecting a subset of the proposed updates, based
on the data held by the voting committee members and a voting scheme. Thus, at each round of the algorithm, the data
used by the committee can be viewed as holdout data for that round.
We demonstrate the quality and robustness of our scheme both theoretically and empirically. First, we provide
convergence guarantees and convergence rates for the algorithm. Second, we show that it is Byzantine-resilient, in
the sense that the votes cast by honest voting committee members are resilient to the corrupted updates generated
by Byzantine workers, resulting in convergence under a Byzantine fraction f < 0.5. We study the probability of the
voting committee being compromised by a majority of Byzantine nodes, and derive the size of committee needed to
ensure the convergence of the algorithm, with high probability. While for the theoretical proofs we make some relaxing
assumptions (most notably convexity) in the empirical evaluation of HoldOut SGD we consider a typical deep-learning
scenario, and show that it withstands attacks on which previous approaches failed.
Paper Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the distributed
learning setting with Byzantine workers, and on existing Byzantine-resilient algorithms for distributed SGD. Section 3
introduces our algorithm, HoldOut SGD. Section 4 provides theoretical claims for HoldOut SGD, while Section 5
describes empirical results comparing HoldOut SGD to other Byzantine-resilient methods for distributed learning.
Finally, Section 6 gives some concluding remarks.
2 Background
2.1 Distributed Learning with SGD
We follow the distributed model described in [4], which includes a centralized parameter server, n worker nodes, among
which a fraction f ∈ [0, 1] can be Byzantine nodes. We assume the Byzantine nodes exhibit arbitrary behavior as
individuals, and also have the ability to operate in coalition.
Let X1, . . . , Xm be a set of m i.i.d. samples representing the training set, where m is large (e.g., each Xi is a labeled
image). Let w represent the parameters of a machine learning model to be trained on X (e.g., the model maps between
2
A PREPRINT - AUGUST 12, 2020
Algorithm 1: Distributed SGD: code for parameter server and workers
1 Procedure DistributedSGD (T , n, w1): # performed by the parameter server
2 for epoch t ∈ [T ] do
3 Pt← Select N nodes uniformly at random;
4 for node i ∈ Pt do
5 ∇Li(wt)← i.getUpdate(wt);
6 vt ← A(∇Li1(wt), ...,∇LiN (wt));
7 wt+1 ← wt − ηtvt;
8 Function getUpdate (wt): # performed by the participant worker
9 Draw B samples from internal dataset uniformly at random;
10 return gradient∇Li(wt) to server;
an image and its label). Consider a loss function L(X;w) that measures the discrepancy between the model w and the
given example X .1
The goal of the training process is to find a model w∗ that minimizes the training loss L(X;w) defined as:2
L(X;w) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
L(Xi;w).
In the context of Federated Learning this is done via a variant of Stochastic Gradient Descent defined as follows (see
Algorithm 1): Each worker i ∈ {1, ..., n} holds mi samples (
∑n
i=1mi = m), drawn randomly from the dataset. Let t
represent the current epoch, wt be the learned model parameters at epoch t, and d be the dimension of the parameter
space w.
At epoch t, the parameter server randomly selects Pt, a group of N nodes (where usually N  n) as participants in the
current round. Each selected node i ∈ Pt updates its model parameters to wt (received from the parameter server at the
end of epoch t − 1), randomly draws Bit which consists of B samples (also called a “mini-batch”) from its internal
dataset and reports the relevant gradient to the parameter server. Formally, denote the loss function over the selected
mini-batch of node i by Li(wt) so that:
Li(wt) =
1
B
∑
j∈Bit
L(Xj ;w),
and ∇Li(wt) is the gradient of Li(wt), reported to the parameter server.
The parameter server then runs an aggregation rule A over all reported gradients and decides on the resulting update it
should take. We denote this selected update by vt. Using a learning rate ηt > 0, the parameter server takes a step in the
direction of the selected update wt+1 ← wt − ηtvt and reports the updated parameters wt+1 to all nodes, declaring the
end of the training epoch.
It can be seen that if the aggregation rule A is an average of all reported gradients then Algorithm 1 is equivalent to the
case of centralized SGD [17] with a mini-batch size of NB.
2.2 Existing Byzantine-Resilient Aggregation Rules
As mentioned earlier, Distributed SGD can be very sensitive to Byzantine nodes. Several approaches have been
suggested to address this difficulty. These differ mostly in the way they perform aggregation over the participant
gradient proposals. Existing aggregation rules work by removing gradients that are “far” from the mean (or other
notions of set center), treating them as adversarial outliers. For example, the Krum method [8] returns the set of
gradients that has the smaller radius (measured in L2 in parameter space). Similarly, the Coordinate-wise Trimmed
Mean method [9] uses an aggregation which evaluates a robust mean around the median. In [18] it was shown that these
approaches are in fact prone to attacks where small directed changes to many parameters can take advantage of the
non-convexity of the loss function, causing the learning process to converge into an ineffectual model.
1For example, if X is a labeled image and w is a classification model then L is the cross-entropy loss of the model on the labeled
image.
2Of course, the true goal of learning is to find a model that generalizes well; our analysis can be adapted to give similar bounds
for the test loss, but for simplicity, here we focus on training optimization.
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Algorithm 2: HoldOut SGD: code for parameter server & workers
1 Procedure HoldOutSGD (T , n, w1): # performed by the parameter server
2 for epoch t ∈ [T] do
3 Pt← Select Np nodes uniformly at random;
4 Ct ← Select Nc nodes uniformly at random;
5 for node i ∈ Pt do
6 ∇Li(wt)← i.getUpdate(wt)
7 for node c ∈ Ct do
8 V otesc ← c.getV otes(∇Li1(wt), ...,∇LiNp (wt))
9 vt ← AConsensus({V otesc1 , ..., V otescNc }, {∇Li1(wt), ...,∇LiNp (wt)});
10 wt+1 ← wt − ηtvt;
11 Function getUpdate (wt): # performed by the proposer worker
12 Draw B samples uniformly at random from internal dataset;
13 return gradient∇Li(wt) to server;
14 Function getVotes (∇Li1(wt), ...,∇LiNp (wt)): # performed by the committee member worker
15 Draw mc samples uniformly at random from internal dataset;
16 V otes← AHoldout(∇Li1(wt), ...,∇LiNp (wt));
17 return V otes to server;
3 HoldOut SGD
3.1 The Algorithm
An epoch of HoldOut SGD begins like regular DistributedSGD, where at each epoch t a set of “proposer” nodes Pt
are randomly selected, and calculate their gradients based on their private data. Next, HoldOut SGD randomly selects
a subset of the workers as a voting committee, which we refer to as Ct. Each committee member then evaluates the
proposed updates on its own private dataset, to obtain a direct estimate of the loss function. The intuition behind this
approach is that the private data of a (honest) committee member can be used to evaluate the different proposed model
updates. In particular, model updates proposed by Byzantine nodes are less likely to work well on the private data of a
committee member.
The core of the algorithm is the use of the voting committee for generating a model update out of the proposed updates,
which we explain next. Let Np denote the number of proposer nodes, and Nc the number of voting committee nodes.
At round t, each proposer i ∈ Pt reports the gradient ∇Li(wt) to the parameter server using a mini-batch of size B, as
in the standard Distributed SGD algorithm (see Algorithm 1, Section 2.1).3 The parameter server then sends the Np
received proposals to each voting committee member. Each voter c ∈ Ct then calculates the loss value of each of the
Np updates, on its own private data, namely, it calculates Lc(wt − η∇Lj(wt)) for j ∈ Pt. This set of Np values is then
sorted and the indices of the Np(1− f) smallest values (best ranked) are returned. In other words, committee member
c returns the Np(1− f) most promising proposals, relative to its private data. We use AHoldout to refer to the function
that takes the Np proposals and returns the Np(1− f) indices.
In the final step, the parameter server integrates the information from all committee members. This is done via a
procedure AConsensus that takes as input all Nc votes, and proposed gradients, finds a set of proposals, each of which
has received a sufficient number of votes from committee members, and returns their average. See Section 3.2 for
details.
It can be seen that if the aggregation rule AHoldout is simply a random choice (each committee member selects an
update from one proposer at random) and the aggregation rule AConsensus is an average over all updates that received
any votes, then Algorithm 2 is equivalent to the centralized SGD with a mini-batch size of NcB.
3.2 The Union-Consensus
To calculate AConsensus the parameter server selects the proposers that have received at least Nc(1 − f) votes. We
refer to this group as the Union-Consensus of round t (or UCt). The output of AConsensus is simply the vector vt that
3We assume the Byzantine nodes exhibit arbitrary behavior as individuals, and also have the ability to operate in coalition.
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is the average of vectors in UCt, namely:
vt =
1
|UCt|
∑
i∈UCt
∇Li(wt). (1)
In order to show that this is well defined, we show below that the set UCt cannot be empty.
Lemma 1. The Union-Consensus group cannot be an empty set.
Proof. By contradiction; assume that the Union-Consensus is empty. Then no proposer has been voted for by at least
Nc(1− f) committee members. Let |V | denote the total number of votes received for all the proposers. Then it follows
that |V | < Np ·Nc(1− f). However, each of the Nc committee members must cast Np(1− f) unique votes, meaning
that |V | = Nc ·Np(1− f), leading to a contradiction.
The intuition behind the AConsensus construction is that, first, the honest voters vote for the top Np(1− f) proposers,
not vouching for updates that are expected to be least effectual when evaluated over the private data held by each voter.
This approach is similar to the construction of the score in Krum [8] and in Trimmed Mean [9]. Second, in order to
reach a consensus, only proposers that receive at least Nc(1− f) votes are taken into account, making sure that if a
Byzantine node is selected it has to “win the trust” of Nc(1− 2f) honest committee members (since it can create a
coalition with the rest of the f Byzantine nodes). Notice, that the random selection of a new set of proposers and voting
committee at each iteration, prevents the Byzantine nodes from trying to resemble to a particular truthful node or set of
nodes that tend to lead to a less effectual joint model.
As an example, consider the case where the ratio of Byzantine nodes in the population is f = 13 . In this case
2
3Nc of the
committee members are expected to be honest and a Byzantine node would need to convince at leastNc(1−2f) = 13Nc
honest committee members, meaning at least half of the honest committee members, that it is better (when evaluated
over their true internal data) than other honest proposers.
This structure constrains the Byzantine workers from controlling the proposers or voting committee. Since these groups
are chosen at random in each round, planning ahead or controlling the selection process is not possible.
Finally, note that for the case f = 0, HoldOut SGD reduces to centralized SGD with a mini-batch size of Np ·B, since
the committee has no effect in this case.
3.3 A Fully Decentralized Implementation
In most practical situations a central server exists and the above distributed HoldOut SGD algorithm provides a good
solution. However, if workers do not trust the central server, or the server may fail, a fully distributed implementation,
without a central parameter server, is then desired. A simple approach is for each worker to perform the central server
algorithm locally. Each committee member (proposer, or voter) instead of sending its gradient proposal, or votes, to the
central server, broadcasts its message to all workers, thus increasing the communication complexity from O(Np +Nc)
to O(nNp + nNc).
There are still a few difficulties that have to be overcome. First, members of each of the different committees need to
be randomly selected without the Byzantine workers being able to affect the selection, or predict the set of workers
to be chosen (otherwise they might DDoS them). Secondly, since the Byzantine voters may send different votes to
different sets of workers, they may cause the honest consensus workers to compute slightly different sets of model
parameters, each being legal (see Algorithm 3). In order to mimic a HoldOut SGD central server operations the honest
workers should agree on the same set of model parameters at the end of each epoch. These difficulties resemble the
blockchain model (in some sense also the State Machine Replication, but SMR is not applicable here). Hence we
borrow techniques from the blockchain domain, specifically the Algorand committee selection and consensus algorithm
[14] to coordinate the operations of the workers in the same way as nodes in Algorand coordinate and synchronize.
Following [14], we assume the setup in which each worker has selected a pair of public and secret cryptography keys,
and a SHA256 random oracle hash function has been agreed upon, before the algorithm starts. After the setup has
been established and shared by all workers, a procedure to select a random string S1 is invoked, to be used in the
committees membership selection process. This and the requirement for a consensus step, makes the fully distributed
algorithm resilient to f < 1/3 Byzantine workers rather than < 1/2 in the semi-distributed variant. A pseudo algorithm
is provided in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3: Decentralized HoldOut SGD: code for worker i, i ∈ [n]
1 Procedure DecentralisedHoldOutSGD (T , w1):
2 wi1 ← w1;
3 for epoch t ∈ [T ] do
4 ***— Proposing round — ***;
5 proposer← (H(St, “P”, Signski(t)) < q1) . Using random oracle H (SHA256), ski worker i’s secret key,
q1 probability of being a proposer;
6 if proposer then
7 Broadcast (getUpdate(wit),Signski(t))
8 ***— Voting round — ***;
9 voter← (H(St, “V ”, Signski(t)) < q2) . q2 probability of being a voter;
10 if voter then
11 Receive ({∇Lj1(wj1t ), Signskj1 (t)), . . . , (∇LjN′ (w
jN′
t ), Signskj
N′
(t)});
12 Verify received proposed gradients;
13 V otes← AHoldout(∇Lj1(wj1t ), ...,∇LjN′ (wjN′t ));
14 Broadcast (V otes, Signski(t))
15 ***— Holdout Soft Consensus Convergence round — ***;
16 Receive {(V otesj1 , Signskj1 (t)), . . . , (V otesjN′c , SignskjN′c (t))};
17 vit ← AConsensus({V otesj1 , ..., V otesjN′c});
18 w′it+1 ← wit − ηt · vit;
19 ***- Consensus round (use Algorand Consensus) agree on common model -***;
20 Cons− committee← (H(St, “C”, Signski(t)) < q3) . q3 probability of being a committee member;
21 if Cons− committee then
22 wit+1 := Algorand Consensus with w
′i
t+1 as initial suggestion;
23 Share wit+1 with all . incurring additional nNcon messages;
24 Function getUpdate (wit):
25 Draw B samples uniformly at random from internal dataset;
26 return gradient∇Li(wit) to server;
4 HoldOut SGD: Theoretical Claims
In this section we prove theoretical properties of HoldOut SGD, establishing its convergence under appropriate
assumptions and proving the resilience of the committee to Byzantine inputs. Our main result is Theorem 1.
4.1 Assumptions
We assume that for all X , the loss function L(X,w) is differentiable and β-smooth with respect to w ∈W (in other
words, it has a β-Lipschitz gradient). Recall that if f(w) is β-smooth then for all w,w′ it holds that:
f(w′) ≤ f(w) +∇f(w) · (w′ − w) + β
2
‖w′ − w‖2. (2)
We will also assume that each L(X, ·) is G-Lipschitz, that is ‖∇L(X;w)‖ ≤ G for all X and w. Thus, the variance
of the gradient reported by any honest node is bounded by E[‖∇Li(w)−∇L(w)‖2] ≤ G2/B, where B is the node’s
mini-batch size. Finally, we assume that the average loss L(w) is α-strongly convex, which in particular implies that
for all w:
‖∇L(w)‖2 ≥ 2α(L(w)− L(w∗)). (3)
Where w∗ is optimal minimizer of L.
The above assumptions are standard and common in the analysis of convex optimization algorithms (e.g., see [19] for
more background and references). Our analysis focuses on providing guarantees of convergence to a global minimum
in the convex case. Some of our arguments can be adapted to show convergence to a critical point in the non-convex
setting.
6
A PREPRINT - AUGUST 12, 2020
4.2 Notations
The HoldOut SGD algorithm takes as input the parameters {Np, Nc, f, B,mc}, where f reflects the expected proportion
of Byzantine workers in the population, mc is the number of samples used by a committee member to perform the
holdout evaluation, and B the mini-batch size used by a proposer to generate the reported gradient. Let j(c) be the index
of the proposer j selected by some committee member c, let Lc be the loss defined over its internal dataset and vt the
final update used at round t (see Eq. 1).
4.3 Byzantine Gradient Tolerance
We define a condition on any aggregation rule to ensure that it is Byzantine-resilient to corrupted gradients at each
iteration t. We show that HoldOut SGD satisfies this condition and in the next section use this result to prove that
HoldOut SGD is Byzantine-resilient and converges close to the optimal solution even under the presence of Byzantine
workers.
As suggested by [8], the aggregation rule should output a vector vt that is not too far from the actual gradient∇L(wt).
Since the actual gradient points in the direction of steepest ascent, we would like to place a lower bound over the
inner-product between the suggested gradient and the actual one. If this inner-product is bounded from below, it limits
the ability of a Byzantine worker to cause the aggregation rule to choose an update in a direction too far away from the
actual gradient.
We show that for every honest committee member c, the updates voted by c are bounded by their distance from the true
gradient of Lc (based on the internal dataset of c), and use this result to prove that HoldOut SGD is Byzantine-resilient.
Definition 1. An aggregation rule A is ε-Byzantine-gradient-tolerant, if it satisfies that:
E[vt · ∇L(w)] ≥ ‖∇L(w)‖2 − ε,
where vt = A(∇L1(w), ...,∇LN (w)).
Proposition 1. Assume that f < 12 and that the proposers have an honest majority. Then HoldOut SGD is (
1
2βG
2ηt)-
Byzantine-gradient-tolerant w.r.t. to any honest committee member c at any iteration t. Namely:
E[∇Lj(c)(wt) · ∇Lc(wt)] ≥ E[‖∇L(wt)‖2]−
1
2
βG2ηt.
Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows: at every round t, each honest committee member holds a gradient∇Lc(wt),
which is an unbiased estimate of the true gradient ∇L(wt). The proposition shows that the presence of a proportion of
f < 12 Byzantine proposers cannot impact the voting process of an honest committee member c too much, with respect
to its unbiased estimated of the gradient∇Lc(wt).
Proof. Consider an update j(c) voted for by an honest committee member c, at iteration t. By convexity and β-
smoothness of Lc, we have for any honest proposer i that
0 ≤ Lc(wt − ηt∇Li(wt))− (Lc(wt)− ηt∇Li(wt) · ∇Lc(wt)) ≤ 1
2
βη2t ‖∇Li(wt)‖2,
and since ‖∇Li(wt)‖ ≤ G this implies∣∣Lc(wt − ηt∇Li(wt))− Lc(wt) + ηt∇Li(wt) · ∇Lc(wt)∣∣ ≤ 1
2
βG2η2t .
Thus, minimizing Lc(wt − ηt∇Li(wt))− Lc(wt) is equivalent to maximizing the inner-product∇Li(wt) · ∇Lc(wt)
up to an additive βG2ηt/2.
From the definition of AHoldout it holds for f < 12 and an honest majority of proposers, that there exists at least one
honest proposer i such that:
Lc(wt − ηt∇Lj(c)(wt)) ≤ Lc(wt − ηt∇Li(wt)).
For the above honest proposer i we have:
∇Lj(c)(wt) · ∇Lc(wt) ≥ ∇Li(wt) · ∇Lc(wt)−
1
2
βG2ηt.
The proposition follows by taking the expectation of this inequality and noting that Li and Lc are independent and
E[∇Li(wt)] = E[∇Lc(wt)] = ∇L(wt).
7
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4.4 Honest Majority
The condition that both voters and proposers sets have a majority of honest nodes is at the core of the HoldOut SGD
algorithm. Both Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 rely on this assumption. However, since both committee and proposers
groups are randomly selected at each training epoch, this condition could fail with a non-zero probability. In what
follows we show that this failure probability can be made arbitrarily low via an appropriate choice of committee size.
Given a confidence level δ > 0, let:
N(T, δ) = 2
(1 + 2f)
(1− 2f)2 ln
T
δ
. (4)
The next lemma shows that if the size of the committee at least N(T, δ), the committee is guaranteed to have a majority
of non-Byzantine nodes with probability greater than 1− δ.
Lemma 2. Let n be a set of nodes, and f < 12 be the fraction of Byzantine nodes in n. Let At be group of N nodes,
selected uniformly at random without replacement from the n nodes at iteration t. Then if N ≥ N(T, δ), the probability
that one of the sets A1, . . . , AT has a majority of Byzantine nodes is smaller than δ.
As can be observed, the derived lower bound grows logarithmically with T , the number of iterations, and 1δ , representing
the confidence level. The lower bound also depends on f , the proportion of Byzantine nodes in the population, and
grows as f grows closer to 12 .
Proof. LetXt represent the number of selected Byzantine nodes inAt. ThenXt follows aHypergeometric(n, nf,N)
distribution. From the properties of the Hypergeometric distribution we get:
µ = X¯t = N · n · f
n
= N · f.
From Chernoff bounds we have that for all  > 0 it holds that P (Xt ≥ (1 + )µ) ≤ e−
2µ
2+ . The probability of a
Byzantine majority at iteration t can then be bounded as follows:
P
(
Xt ≥ N
2
)
= P
(
X ≤
(
1 +
( 1
2f
− 1
))
µ
)
≤ e− (1−2f)
2
(1+2f)
N
2 ,
where  = 12f − 1 ≥ 0 because f < 12 . To upper bound the probability that one of the sets has a Byzantine majority we
use the union bound:
P
(
T⋃
t=1
{
Xt ≥ N
2
})
≤ T · e− (1−2f)
2
(1+2f)
N
2 ≤ δ,
where the last inequality follows from N ≥ N(T, δ).
4.5 Convergence Analysis
In this section we analyze the convergence rate of the HoldOut SGD algorithm and prove that it is Byzantine-resilient.
We assume that the loss function L(X, ·) is G-Lipschitz and β-smooth for any X and that the expected risk L is
α-strongly convex. For the SGD step-size we take ηt = 1/(2αt).
Our main theorem below states HoldOut SGD converges at a rate of O( log TT ) to a ball of radius O(
1√
mc
) around the
optimal w∗. Importantly, the theorem holds whenever the fraction of Byzantine workers is f < 0.5.
Theorem 1. Let f < 12 be the fraction of Byzantine nodes and δ > 0 a desired confidence level. Then the following
holds: if Nc, Np ≥ N(2T, δ) then with probability greater than 1− δ the error of HoldOut SGD satisfies:
E[L(wT )]− L(w∗) = O
(
G2
α
√
mc
+
βG2
α2
log T
T
)
,
where w∗ is the minimizer of L.
Proof. Let us first observe the step taken by a single update j(c) voted for by some honest committee member c. Since
L has Lipschitz first derivative we know that:
L(wt − ηt∇Lj(c)) ≤ L(wt)− ηt∇Lj(c)(wt) · ∇L(wt) +
1
2
βη2t ‖∇Lj(c)‖2.
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Writing this differently:
L(wt − ηt∇Lj(c))
≤ L(wt)− ηt∇Lj(c) · (∇L(wt)−∇Lc(wt) +∇Lc(wt)) + 1
2
βη2t ‖∇Lj(c)‖2
= L(wt)− ηt∇Lj(c) · (∇L(wt)−∇Lc(wt))− ηt∇Lj(c) · ∇Lc(wt) + 1
2
βη2t ‖∇Lj(c)‖2.
Taking the expectation conditioned on all randomness before iteration t (and using Et[·] to denote this), and using the
bound over the stochastic gradients, we get:
Et[L(wt − ηt∇Lj(c))]
≤ L(wt) + ηtEt[∇Lj(c) · (∇Lc(wt)−∇L(wt))]− ηtEt[∇Lj(c) · ∇Lc(wt)] + 1
2
βη2tG
2.
Using Proposition 1:4
Et[L(wt − ηt∇Lj(c))] (5)
≤ L(wt) + ηtEt[∇Lj(c) · (∇Lc(wt)−∇L(wt))]− ηt‖∇L(wt)‖2 + 1
2
βη2tG
2 +
1
2
βη2tG
2
≤ L(wt) + ηt
√
Et[‖∇Lj(c)‖2]Et[‖∇Lc(wt)−∇L(wt)‖2]− ηt‖∇L(wt)‖2 + 1
2
βη2tG
2
≤ L(wt) + ηtG
2
√
mc
− ηt‖∇L(wt)‖2 + βη2tG2, (6)
where we use the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the bounds over the stochastic gradients in the last two transitions.
Using the definition of HoldOut SGD we can write:
wt+1 = wt − ηt · vt = wt − ηt 1|UCt|
∑
i∈UCt
∇Li(wt) = 1|UCt|
∑
i∈UCt
(wt − ηt∇Li(wt)).
Since L is convex:
L(wt+1) ≤ 1|UCt|
∑
i∈UCt
L(wt − ηt∇Li(wt)).
Using Lemma 2 with N(2T, δ) we get that with a confidence level of δ both proposers and committee groups are
populated with an honest majority of members. Therefore, each∇Li(wt), i ∈ UCt was voted by at least one honest
committee member c and can therefore be written as∇Li(c)(wt). Using Eq. 5 we can write:
Et[L(wt+1)] ≤ 1|UCt|
∑
i∈UCt
L(wt − ηt∇Li(c)(wt))
≤ 1|UCt|
∑
i∈UCt
[
L(wt) +
ηtG
2
√
mc
− ηt‖∇L(wt)‖2 + βη2tG2
]
= L(wt) +
ηtG
2
√
mc
− ηt‖∇L(wt)‖2 + βη2tG2.
Subtracting L(w∗) from both sides and taking the expectation before iteration t, we have:
E[L(wt+1)− L(w∗)] ≤ E[L(wt)− L(w∗)]− E[ηt‖∇L(wt)‖2] + βη2tG2 +
ηtG
2
√
mc
.
Since L is α-strongly convex, it respects Eq. 3 in Section 4.1:
E[L(wt+1)− L(w∗)] ≤ (1− 2αηt)E[L(wt)− L(w∗)] + βη2tG2 +
ηtG
2
√
mc
.
4Note that the conditions of 1 hold here with probability greater than 1− δ because N ≥ N(δ) and Lemma 2.
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Unfolding the recursion, we obtain
E[L(wT )− L(w∗)]
≤
[
T−1∏
s=1
(1− 2αηs)
]
E[L(w1)− L(w∗)] +
T−1∑
t=1
[
T−1∏
s=t+1
(1− 2αηs)
](
G2ηt√
mc
+ βG2η2t
)
.
Now we set ηt = 1/(2αt) and observe that
∏T−1
s=t+1(1− 2αηs) = tT−1 , thus
E[L(wT )− L(w∗)] ≤
T−1∑
t=1
t
T − 1
(
G2ηt√
mc
+ βG2η2t
)
≤ G
2
2α
√
mc
+
βG2
4α2
log T
T − 1 .
Additional observations regarding Theorem 1: (i) The theorem is stated with high probability because the selection
of committees is random, and may thus potentially result in committees with a Byzantine majority. However, the
probability of this bad event can be made arbitrarily low by choosing Np, Nc as in the theorem (see also Section 4.4);
(ii) Controlling the number of samples mc used by the committee to evaluate and vote over the suggested updates at
each round can allow us to reduce the impact of the relevant term in Theorem 1 and converge closer to the optimal
solution.
5 Empirical Results
We implemented our HoldOut SGD algorithm as well as the methods described in Section 2.2, and simulated Byzantine
behavior using the attack described in Section 5.1.2. We report the results of existing methods and the HoldOut SGD
algorithm over the MNIST [20] and CIFAR-10 [21] datasets.
5.1 Implementation Details
5.1.1 Models, Baselines and Data Generation
For MNIST, we use a fully connected network with 1 hidden layer, 784 dimensional flattened input, a 100-dimensional
hidden layer, and a 10-dimensional output, trained with cross-entropy loss objective and using ReLU activations. The
model was trained for 100 epochs with mini-batch size of 83 (as selected by [10, 18]), a learning rate of 0.1 and no
momentum.
For CIFAR-10, we use the LeNet-5 network [22] which is constructed from the following layers: (32x32x3) input, a
convolutional layer with kernel size: 5 × 5, 6 feature maps and a stride of 1, max-pooling layer of size 2 × 2, a second
convolutional layer with kernel 5 × 5, 16 feature maps and a stride of 1, a final max-pooling layer identical to the first
one, followed by two fully connected layers of sizes 120 and 84 respectively, and an output layer of size 10. ReLU
activations were used in all layers. The model was trained for 1000 epochs with mini-batch size of 256, a learning rate
of 0.1 and no momentum.
We follow the work of [18] and [10] in the choice of the models, targeting simple architectures to demonstrate the effect
of the Byzantine workers.
We compare HoldOut SGD to two recent Byzantine-resilient aggregation rules, Krum [8] and Coordinate-wise Trimmed
Mean [9]. The current State-of-the-art is the Bulyan method [10], which is the evolution of both. It combines both
aggregation algorithms and was shown in [18] to suffer from similar vulnerabilities. Furthermore, Bulyan provides
theoretical guarantees to be Byzantine-resilient only up to f < 14 . Therefore, we chose to not include it in the empirical
results of this paper. Finally, we also compare to the simplest aggregation of averaging the gradients (namely, standard
SGD).
Data was generated as follows. A pool of 100 nodes was generated, where each node sampled m examples from the
dataset as its private internal dataset. For MNIST we used Np = Nc = 30 and an expected Byzantine rate of f = 0.33
and m = 2000. For CIFAR-10 we used Np = Nc = 12 and an expected Byzantine rate of f = 0.33 and m = 1000.
The choice of f = 0.33 is common practice, since it also represents the theoretical bounds of Byzantine-agreement
algorithms.
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Figure 1: Accuracy during training for the MNIST dataset. Four aggregation rules are compared. Left: A Byzantine-free
setting. Right: 0f = 33% Byzantines. The Average (no attack) curve corresponds to the non Byzantine setting, and
therefore an upper bound on accuracy.
5.1.2 Adversarial Attack over the Parameter Space
The attack was identical for all Byzantine nodes selected as proposers, and was used over all aggregation methods and
on both datasets. Byzantine committee members, relevant for the HoldOut SGD algorithm only, were designed for a
powerful attack, creating a coalition that votes for all Byzantine proposers first, followed by a remainder of random
votes for honest proposers to reach the Np(1− f) vote count. Note that this attack is a rather extreme case, which we
do not expect in real-world settings. Thus, in typical scenarios, actual performance of HoldOut SGD is expected to be
much better than that reported here.
A general assumption in distributed learning is that the different datasets held by all honest workers are i.i.d. in nature
and therefore can be represented by some normal distribution. Due to this distribution of the data, an adversary can
estimate the mean and standard deviation of the reported updates from the last training epoch. As the learning process
converges, this estimation becomes more and more relevant to the distribution of the updates in the current epoch [23]
allowing the attacker to calculate a margin of poisoning [10]. This margin represents the degree to which the attacker
can perturb the estimated mean of honest parameter updates, while still remaining close enough to the mean so it is
selected by the Byzantine-resilient aggregation rule. All of the existing attacks in parameter space rely on some concept
in the spirit of the margin of poisoning, aiming for the maximal undetected perturbation away from the mean. We focus
on a similar attack strategy [18] where the adversary perturbs all parameters under the constraint of remaining as close
as possible to the mean.
Algorithm 4: Attack over the Parameter Space: code for Byzantine worker i.
1 Function getUpdate (wt):
2 Estimate µt ∈ Rd, σt ∈ Rd, γmax,t ∈ R;
3 Set ~Vt ← µt + γmax,tσt;
4 return ~Vt
At each training epoch the adversary estimates µt and σt, the mean and standard deviation of the gradient updates
reported by the honest workers {∇Li1(wt), ...,∇LiNp(1−f)(wt)}. This estimate can also be accomplished by a non-
omniscient adversary, by controlling a small segment of corrupted nodes [18]. In the experiments we performed, we
assumed an omniscient adversary for the purpose of worst case analysis. The adversary then estimates γmax,t (see
below) and uses it to calculate the final reported Byzantine update ~Vt (see Algorithm 4). The factor γmax,t is for the
aggregation rule under attack and is chosen to be maximal, under the constraint of keeping the reported Byzantine
update ~Vt close enough to µt as possible to fool the aggregation rule into choosing ~Vt. Baruch et al. [18] showed that
γmax,t ≈ 1.75 is effective, where this value was derived from the CDF of the normal distribution. In our empirical
experiments we allow the omniscient attacker to evaluate γmax,t at each round by running the aggregation rule internally
and inflating γmax,t up to the point ~Vt is no longer chosen by the aggregation rule.
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5.2 Results
We first validated the convergence of the HoldOut SGD algorithm by applying it to the MNIST dataset and comparing
its convergence to other methods, in a Byzantine-free setting (f = 0). Figure 1(left) shows that HoldOut SGD converges
as fast as the average and Trimmed-Mean aggregation rules, and all outperform Krum.
Next, we evaluated learning under the attack of Section 5.1.2. Results are shown in Figure 1(right). As can be seen,
except for HoldOut SGD, the attack over the parameter space was enough to damage all other methods. Trimmed-Mean
suffered a 4% decrease in test accuracy compared to accuracy without attack, while Krum converged into a completely
ineffectual model suffering over 50% decrease in test accuracy.
Finally, we ran the learning process over the CIFAR-10 dataset, with the Byzantine setting of Section 5.1.2. Figure 2
shows that even though HoldOut SGD suffers an impact under this crafted attack, it still outperforms all other methods.
While Trimmed-Mean suffered from 50% decrease in test accuracy, compared to the average aggregation rule under no
attack, and Krum suffered over 65%, HoldOut SGD resulted in about 15% decrease at the end of the learning process.
Figure 2: CIFAR-10: test accuracy up to training epoch 1000, comparing the performance of the different aggregation
rules, under an actual Byzantine proportion of 33%. The Average (no attack) stands as reference to the performance
under a Byzantine-free environment.
6 Concluding remarks
Developing distributed SGD implementations that are Byzantine-resilient and efficient is an important goal, given the
growth in scale of user-data and the corresponding emerging privacy concerns. A Byzantine tolerant SGD algorithm
might be useful not only against a dedicated adversary whose goal is to generate an ineffectual model, but can also be
useful in reducing the impact of biased data originating from unreliable sources.
Our theoretical results for Byzantine tolerance consider worst case attacks (e.g., including coalitions, omniscient
Byzantine nodes having perfect estimation of gradients for honest workers etc.). Under the assumption that the target
loss function is convex we provide convergence guarantees that tolerate up to half the workers being Byzantine (f < 12 ).
Our theoretical guarantees are for the convex case, since this is currently the main setting in which convergence to
global optima can be proven. Obtaining global optimality results for non-convex settings is a challenging open question,
and results are only available for rather limited settings such as linear networks, matrix completion, or very wide
networks [24, 25, 26]. That said, HoldOut SGD is applicable to non-convex optimization and we show empirically that
in these cases it is more robust to attacks than strong recent baselines.
HoldOut SGD was designed to tackle the Byzantine attacks aiming to cause the learning process to converge to a poor
accuracy model. We did not cover the type of attacks referred to as “backdooring” where the adversary is trying to
insert a hidden backdoor into the learned model, while preserving its performance over target test set.
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Our fully decentralized implementation in Section 3.3 offers the opportunity for fully distributed SGD algorithms that
eliminate the central parameter server. This is motivated by the desire to have a more democratic learning algorithm,
where there is no one entity that governs the algorithms that run on the central server. In the same way that federated
blockchains take the governance power from one central entity (e.g., a bank) and give it to a group of entities. Here, a
group of entities will govern the learning process, thus turning the algorithm into a federated, federated learning (the
first federated corresponds to the distribution of the governance, and the second for federated learning). We leave for
future work a full evaluation of this approach, as well as further analysis of its computational and statistical properties.
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